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In the late 1960s, a workers’ movement at Lucas Aerospace was formed and proposed 
alternative products other than military production. Reacting to some 5,000 
redundancies in the company across its thirteen sites nationally, a ‘combine’ 
committee of shop-stewards and workers accused the company management of 
lobbying for defence orders ahead of civilian manufacturing. Despite acclaim for the 
combine from the left-wing of the Labour Party and the disarmament movement, the 
1974-79 Labour Government did not favour the workers’ proposals and referred the 
combine to the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. Behind the 
scenes, Labour ministers at the Department of Industry felt that the combine would 
upset the balance of the defence industry, which was at that time an important 
contributor to employment and the balance of payments, as well as Britain’s military 
role in the Cold War.  
Keywords: Lucas Aerospace, Defence Industry, Labour Party, Trade Unions, Cold 
War 
 
Introduction  
Britain witnessed a long series of industrial crises throughout manufacturing in the 
1970s. The decade was blighted by company bankruptcies, increased unemployment, 
intense competition from markets overseas and trade union pay-claim disputes that 
felled the Conservative Government in 1974 and the Labour Government in 1979.
1
 
However, the focus upon industrial policy in the 1970s has neglected to make the link 
between the defence industry and that of Britain’s Cold War role, with a few 
important exceptions.
2
 Britain’s international role relied heavily on procuring 
armaments from domestic manufacturers, providing a major employment base in the 
process.
3
 A fresh historical focus on the British defence industry in the Cold War has 
emerged in the last decade, recovering Britain’s significance as a military power, with 
a particular emphasis on the relationship between the defence industry and the state.
4
 
This reassessment of Britain’s defence economy has provided a new framework for a 
new examination of industrial relations in the 1970s.    
 Stemming from a climate of economic crises throughout the decade, public 
expenditure came in for significant scrutiny from both within and outside government. 
The political economy of government policy came under unprecedented examination 
by the British academic and political left during this decade, with a focus towards 
defence expenditure and foreign policy. The left asserted that since the Second World 
War the political establishment pursued a defence role that had wasted Britain’s 
scientific and technological resources. There was a considerable critique from the left 
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from the mid-1970s into the 1980s, including sophisticated alternate defence policies 
based around reduced spending.
5
 Central to these critiques were analyses of the 
defence industry, which had been previously unexamined by a left-wing movement 
which had focused primarily on nuclear disarmament in the 1950s and 1960s.
6
 By the 
1970s, the left saw the defence industry as having the potential to be ‘converted’ to 
production for social use, such as healthcare and affordable transport. ‘Industrial 
conversion’ and ‘socially useful production’ entered the lexicon of the wider British 
left in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the academic authors of these critiques were in the 
main untrained in engineering or scientific disciplines and could not offer alternatives 
to defence production that had been tried and tested on the factory floor. 
 This situation was changed by the arrival of the Lucas Aerospace Shop 
Stewards Combine Committee that came to the attention of the Labour Party and the 
wider left in the mid-1970s. Composed of mechanical engineers and led by politically 
motivated left-wing shop stewards, the Lucas combine sought to convert its company 
to socially useful production. The combine met with Tony Benn, the Labour industry 
minister, and published its alternative plan in 1975.
7
 Yet despite its left-wing 
inclinations, the combine was deeply suspicious of the Labour Government due to 
Labour’s industrial policies in the 1960s which the Lucas workers blamed for having 
contributed to causing redundancies in the company in the 1960s. The left-wing of the 
Labour Party, which was especially critical of the 1974-79 Labour Government, held 
up the combine as the best example of how industrial conversion could be achieved.
8
 
Nonetheless, the combine operated independently of the Labour Party, and formed its 
own conclusions on how military industry enjoyed a close relationship with the state. 
Although having not achieved its ambitions, the Lucas combine had revealed the 
protectionist tendencies of the Labour Government when it came to the defence 
industry.         
 While the case of Lucas Aerospace has been recognised in both contemporary 
and historical accounts, its significance in regards to the defence industry has not been 
significantly analysed. David Edgerton has argued that the combine missed the impact 
of the ‘warfare state a critical moment’ in the 1970s.
9
 This was due to the attention of 
the combine being overtly towards ousting the Lucas management and revolutionising 
the role of the shop-floor within industry. Contributing to disarmament in the Cold 
War, though an aim of the combine, was secondary to that of achieving control of 
industrial production. The threat of Cold War military-industrial complexes was only 
more fully grasped after the combine had run its course in the late 1970s, and was 
more clearly articulated by social scientists who wrote accounts of the combine than 
by the workers themselves.
10
 This article will therefore place the Lucas combine 
within the context of the British Cold War defence industry. The correspondence the 
combine received from Labour ministers, together with declassified files from within 
the government, revealed the extent to which the defence industry was prioritised as 
indispensable political capital and a source of employment and technological 
development. This article will detail the origin of the Lucas combine, before 
accounting for the reaction it faced from the triad of the company management, 
Labour Government, and trade unions.  
Origins of the ‘Lucas Plan’ 
Lucas Aerospace was a significant player in British aircraft manufacturing, and could 
claim to be Europe’s largest designer and manufacturer of aircraft systems and 
equipment.
11
 Roughly half of the company’s turnover came from engine fuel systems 
that offered the aircraft industry the largest available range of aerospace engine 
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equipment available from a single firm.
12
 Lucas provided equipment to the major 
defence-aerospace companies in Britain, including British Aerospace Corporation 
(BAC), Ferranti and Rolls-Royce. Approximately half of the company’s output was in 
the defence sector, with an estimated 43% in military aircraft and a further 7% in 
other defence industries.
13
 The value of military production to the company prompted 
the formation of ‘Lucas Defence Systems’ in 1973 to focus on military equipment 
specifically, which included electrical equipment for Britain’s Main-Battle Tank in 
the 1970s.
14
 Lucas was also involved with the international Multi-Role Combat 
Aircraft (MRCA) that was shared by Britain, West Germany and Italy, as well as the 
Anglo-French Jaguar civilian aircraft. On the civil side, the company had a close 
working relationship played an active role in the supersonic aircraft, Concorde, and 
the Russian TU-144.                                                   
 Despite its high standing in the industry, Lucas Aerospace was not immune 
from the crises in the British aerospace industry, specifically the cancellation of the 
British TSR-2 (Tactical Strike Reconnaissance) military aircraft in 1965 and the 
collapse of Rolls-Royce in 1971. The TSR-2 aircraft was cancelled by the Labour 
Government in 1965 on the basis that it did not offer enough potential on the export 
market.
15
 The cost of the TSR-2 had soared beyond initial estimates, as the 
development had been initiated by the Conservative Government in the late 1950s to 
replace the Vulcan bomber force. The officially commissioned history of the 
company, Lucas: The First Hundred Years, was critical of the cancellation by the 
Labour Government in 1965, and claimed that ending the TSR-2 ‘halved the aircraft 
industry at one blow’ in Britain.
16
 The official history of the company, published in 
1978, was favourable towards the defence industry, and argued that ‘TSR-2 [had] put 
Lucas into a whole new field of business for airframe and technology, much of which 
withered on the vine’ after the project’s cancellation.
17
 Nonetheless, despite the 
setback of TSR-2, the company management remained dedicated to defence 
production into the 1970s.        
 The decision to remain a defence manufacturer at this point was one of the key 
reasons why workers in the company formed a combine committee. Formed in the 
late 1960s, before gaining momentum in the mid-1970s, the Lucas combine’s 
experience was examined in a comprehensive paperback published in 1982, Lucas: A 
New Trade Unionism in the Making?, authored by social scientists Hillary 
Wainwright and Dave Elliot. Amidst escalating job losses in industry and rising Cold 
War tensions, Wainwright and Elliot opened their account by stating that the ‘two 
main threats to society’ in the early 1980s were ‘unemployment and war’.
18
 The 
authors argued that the combine’s example of peaceful production for social utility 
could avert both fears simultaneously. The text included comprehensive insights from 
combine members who recollected each stage in the experience, from formulating the 
plan until its eventual defeat when the management and Labour Government refused 
to support it. The tone of the book was often bitter towards the 1974-79 Labour 
Government which passed the combine over to unsympathetic trade unions. 
 The acrimonious relations between the combine and the 1974-79 Labour 
Government had its roots in Labour’s policies in the previous decade. Over the course 
of the late 1960s, Labour implemented a policy of ‘rationalization’, or concentration 
of successful firms into larger conglomerates.
19
 The Government’s actions were 
deeply resented by Lucas employees, especially those Labour-voting workers who 
had held out hope of the modernising reforms that was pledged by the Party’s ‘white 
heat of the scientific revolution’.
20
 The laying-off of 5,000 workers from 1970-5 was 
attributed to Labour’s 1960s rationalisation policy, both by the combine and Lucas 
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Aerospace’s official history. A decade later, when considering its own origins, the 
Lucas combine argued that it was ‘as much the child of Harold Wilson as it was of 
Lucas Aerospace itself’.
21
 This was a critical point, for it explained how the 
combine’s scepticism of the 1974-79 Labour Government’s plans to bring the 
aerospace industry into public ownership. By the early 1970s the aerospace industry 
continued to face serious problems. This was seen especially in the Rolls-Royce 
bankruptcy crisis, which in turn had a rapid impact on Lucas Aerospace.
22
 The official 
history noted how the company ‘had to cut back their workforce in the aircraft 
factories from 18,000 to 15,000’, before claiming that ‘all those being made redundant 
were fairly treated’.
23
 This account was later criticised by the combine as having made 
both rationalisation and the Rolls Royce crisis sound ‘remarkably effortless and 
painless’.
24
 Instead, Lucas Aerospace workers recalled their experience of how 
‘almost overnight’, two thousand Lucas workers in Birmingham, Liverpool, and 
Wolverhampton lost their jobs. The numbers of workers employed in aerospace had 
reduced by the 1970s from 283,000 to 190,000, with further losses predicted.
25
 It was 
felt that the traditional method of trade union agitation against management had failed 
to secure stable employment and that a new departure was needed from the workers 
themselves.          
 The first initial meetings of the combine occurred in 1969, with increasing 
frequency into the early 1970s. The combine consisted of representative shop 
stewards from each of Lucas’ thirteen nationwide sites, which together formed an 
executive council which met quarterly, initially at Wortley Hall in Sheffield.
26
 While 
the combine was eager to foster as much workers’ participation as possible, it was 
clear that several figures were becoming prominent in giving both intellectual 
inspiration and leadership to the workers’ campaign. Mike Cooley and Eric Scarbrow, 
two shop stewards and former British Communist Party members based at the Lucas 
site at Willesden, occupied the key posts of secretary and chairman respectively, and 
it was they who provided the main link to the Labour Party and the wider left.
27
 The 
key ambition of the combine was to change both the company’s means of production 
and to decide what products would be manufactured instead. Cutting loose from 
public ownership would, the combine argued, ‘reduce the nagging insecurity’ that 
‘overshadowed the industry for years’, and instead give the workforce a ‘real sense of 
direction and purpose’.
28
       
 Another key aim alongside self-sufficiency was disarmament. Both of 
Labour’s 1974 General Election manifestos sought to reduce defence spending, and 
the Lucas combine welcomed this development, even if it threatened projects that 
their company was involved in. Instead, the proposed cuts in defence expenditure 
reinforced the combine’s desire for peaceful production, with such spending 
reductions thought as being ‘both inevitable and desirable’ and that it was the 
‘national policy of almost all the unions in the combine committee that there should 
be cuts in defence expenditure’.
29
 The joint threat of unemployment and war, the 
combine contended, was commonly thought to ‘be beyond the remit of ordinary 
workers’. The perception existed that ‘technological and market pressures’ were 
producing the constant threat of redundancy, and with it the parallel concern that ‘the 
momentum of the military machine [was] carrying with it the threat of 
extermination.’
30
 A company heavily reliant on defence contracts, such as Lucas 
Aerospace, was seen by the combine as being liable to political vicissitudes, catering 
to continually more advanced military technology.
31
 This had been the case for TSR-2 
in the 1960s as it had been for the Tornado in the 1970s. Anxious over tumultuous 
employment conditions, the workers at Lucas demonstrated ‘in a most practical way 
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how people without any official power might reverse both the drive towards 
militarism and the growth of unemployment’.
32
      
 The combine stepped up its activism when Labour returned to Government in 
February 1974. Meetings had been more frequent from 1972-3, and had created the 
first drafts of what would form the combine’s plan for alternative production. The first 
success of the combine was its meeting with Labour’s industry secretary, Tony Benn, 
in November 1974. A meeting had been requested with the minister, with the combine 
hoping that the left-wing technocrat Benn would enable ‘the skill and ability’ of the 
workers to be properly synchronised for the benefit of the community as a whole’, but 
not like the ‘appalling examples of the past’ where industry was left in the hands of 
‘bungling autocrats’.
33
 Speaking on behalf of the combine, Ernie Scarbrow claimed 
that the workers were open to the idea of Labour’s proposals, but only if members 
could ‘utilise their skills in the interests of the community’.34 Benn, who had 
previously shown support for other campaigns for workers’ control, enthusiastically 
agreed to the meeting and assured the combine ‘that full provision would be made for 
measures to extend industrial democracy’.
35
      
 A deputation of some thirty-three combine members met Benn in his 
ministerial office, with some already sensing the ‘irritation of senior civil servants and 
some national trade union officials’ at them being allowed inside the Department of 
Industry.
36
 This ‘irritation’ was symptomatic of how exceptional the minister’s views 
were by contrast to the civil service and the rest of the Labour Government. Benn, 
who had been Minister for Technology from 1966-70 when Labour was last in power, 
had been greatly impressed by the movement for workers’ control when Labour was 
in opposition from 1970-4. He roused support for the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in 
1972 when the workers there organised a ‘work-in’ to maintain production even after 
the company had announced it could no longer afford to pay most its staff.
37
 Having 
largely centrist views in the 1960s he then moved further to the left, advocating a 
significant increase in public ownership and opposing both the Common Market and 
the nuclear deterrent. By comparison, his two ministers of state, Gerald Kaufman and 
Eric Varley, were less than impressed by his ‘hobby-horse of unviable workers’ co-
operatives’.
38
 In his 1980 account, How to be a Minister, Kaufman mocked Benn who 
‘with very little knowledge or experience of working-class life, was so enchanted with 
the very idea of shop stewards that he saw groups of them at his Departmental 
headquarters whenever they asked to see him and was even rumoured to have a 
special room set aside for them’.
39
      
 This was precisely the case in Benn’s meeting with the Lucas combine in his 
offices in Victoria Street in November 1974. The Labour minister was evidently 
impressed by what he saw as ‘a pioneering combine’ and ‘hoped that that the 
development would become much more widely known and repeated throughout 
industry’.
40
 He issued further encouragement to the combine, citing that within public 
ownership [Labour] will be aiming to ensure that those who work in the industry can 
play a vital part in controlling their own destiny’.
41
 In the meeting Benn was evidently 
in favour of industrial conversion, remarking in light of the disruption to employment 
that could be caused by defence cuts, industry ‘should be thinking of ways of 
producing our way through a slump… and be prepared to diversify’.
42
 In his diary 
entry, Benn noted the impressive nature of the plans drawn up by the combine. ‘In the 
afternoon’, he recalled, ‘I went to one of the most inspiring meetings I have ever 
attended, the best organised combine in the country with all the unions represented… 
they are in fact a complete shadow administration of a very important kind… I found 
myself wholly in sympathy with them’.
43
 Later, when the combine launched its formal 
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plan in January 1976, he noted that ‘they have launched their corporate plan which I 
had encouraged them to do… I was very impressed… by God they have produced 
some excellent stuff - it just shows what the shop floor is capable of’.
44
 
 Despite the enthusiasm from Labour’s industry secretary, the shop-stewards 
and workers in the combine remained sceptical of Labour’s plans to nationalise the 
aerospace industry. A meeting of the combine’s leadership in January 1975 prompted 
moving towards workers’ control of industry instead of a reliance on state 
intervention. The response from the Lucas workers was to organise quarterly meetings 
which reviewed ideas from each of its thirteen factories across Britain. Each site was 
represented by a shop steward who presented ideas to the combine’s leadership.
45
  
Members of the combine to questioned the assumption of military production upon 
which Lucas Aerospace had long relied as a profitable output. Phil Asquith, a Lucas 
Aerospace shop steward and member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND), spoke for many when he claimed ‘we were not going to be lobbying for more 
military orders like some of us had done in the past’.
46
 Alternative production was 
motivated by a resistance towards armaments production. This was prompted the 
climate of competition that favoured cost-effective standardisation. The result was 
frustration for the Lucas engineers. This was exhibited in two ways: first that 
innovative projects would be turned down by management; and secondly, that if 
projects became more elaborate, the contribution of the worker became ‘more 
restricted, more fragmented and less satisfying’.
47
     
 In January 1976, the combine unveiled their proposals ‘to a crowded press 
conference in the upstairs room of a Fleet Street pub’ in London.
48
 It was the 
culmination of several months of drafting, incorporating suggestions from workers, 
and it consisted of some 200 pages of material, with 150 alternative products drawn 
up by shop-stewards and workers. The content of the plan was later viewed as a 
change of direction, representing ‘a shift away from a total reliance on the 
government’ towards ‘unilateral development of a detailed worker-generated 
corporate plan’.
49
 It was felt that ‘this level of self reliance meant that the [combine] 
committee was able to develop much more adventurous and technically sophisticated 
proposals which were suited to their strategic needs’ and demanded ‘the right to work 
on socially useful and needed technologies’.
50
 This encompassed two underlying 
aims: firstly to ‘protect members’ right to work in the event of further cutbacks in the 
aerospace industry’ and secondly ‘to ensure that among the products proposed, there 
would be a number that would be socially useful to the company at large’.
51
 This 
ambition was reflected in the alternative products that were suggested. In healthcare, 
design teams had exhibited a proto-type for the ‘hobcart’ mobility vehicle for children 
with spina bifida; dialysis machines for kidney operations; and a ‘heat-pump’, which 
worked along the same principles as a refrigerator, which supplied heat in an energy-
efficient manner. In the sphere of infrastructure, there was the road-rail hybrid vehicle 
- a bus that was enabled to also drive on railways.     
 The combine was evidently anti-militaristic and hinged their proposals on the 
instability of the armaments market and the defence cuts planned by the Labour 
Government. These cuts were regarded by the combine’s plan as being both 
‘inevitable and desirable’.
52
 The combine tapped into the broader uncertainty 
regarding the Labour Government’s spending plans in which wide-ranging cuts were 
predicted over a whole range of social services. The combine argued that ‘in order to 
make its austerity measures somewhat acceptable, the government will at least have to 
make a gesture towards cuts in defence expenditure’.
53
 It went further to reference the 
Labour defence secretary Roy Mason, who had announced in the Commons his 
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prediction that from the government there would be ‘a marked reduction over the next 
decade in the level of activity in military aerospace projects, particularly on the design 
side’.
54
 Recent memory from the 1960s was plagued by the traumas of cancelled 
defence projects and the ensuing unemployment that followed, and the combine 
forecasted more uncertainty to come. For the next three years, this issue of the virtue 
of military industry was a key point of contention between the combine and its 
detractors in the Lucas management, the trade unions and the Labour Government.  
 
The reaction from the Lucas Aerospace management 
 
As the combine drew up their proposals during 1975, the Lucas Aerospace 
management exhibited no signs of departing from defence production. In the 
company’s 1975 annual report, turnover was described as ‘disappointing’ and was 
explained by low output in some sectors and ‘some grave industrial disputes’ - a 
reference to industrial action in Lucas Aerospace at Burnley and Willesden.
55
 Despite 
the unimpressive turnover, a ‘substantial improvement in results’ was expected and 
this was attributed in no small part to sustaining a presence in the military sector. It 
was felt that the defence reductions would ‘not immediately affect business, but future 
programmes’ with military orders forecasted to ‘contribute some £200m to Lucas 
Aerospace over the next decade’. Export potential was also perceived in other projects 
in the Defence Review, including the Jaguar, Hawk and Sea Harrier. It was evident 
that relations between the management and some workers were already tense before 
the combine set about its campaign for industrial conversion. In a final statement in 
the company’s report, the management contended with reference to industrial 
disputes, that ‘the real success of the business can only occur with the co-operation of 
all concerned’.
56
          
 The wording of the combine’s plan, in particular the desirability of the defence 
cuts, was met with a sharp response of the Lucas Aerospace management three 
months later. Resisting the combine’s arguments about the Labour Government’s 
reductions in defence expenditure, the Lucas management remarked that ‘the recent 
defence cuts had not affected Lucas Aerospace to any great extent’.
57
 There was 
something to be said of this judgement by the management, given that the Labour 
Government’s Defence Review had planned a gradual phased reduction of some 
10,000 workers in the aerospace industry (or 4% of the total in the UK) over the 
course of 1975-80.
58
 The management’s response went further to question the motives 
behind the combine, in particular their opposition to defence spending: 
 
The authors of the report suggest that there would be a 
contraction in the aerospace components industry as a result 
of successive Defence Cuts, a trend which they regard as 
desirable. On this premise they believe that the Company 
should be protecting the jobs of its employees by diversifying 
into socially acceptable/useful products, such as those 
indicated in the report’.
59
 
 
The management disagreed fundamentally with the combine on the value of the 
defence industry. Lucas Aerospace could not ‘accept that aircraft, military or civil, do 
not have a social utility [as] civil aircraft are needed for business and pleasure 
activities, and it is necessary to maintain military aircraft for Defence’.
60
 The combine 
perceived the response as an outright rejection due to its proposal to ‘refer these 
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matters to the local consultative machinery’ - an allusion to the trade unions.
61
 This 
was seen by the combine as Lucas Aerospace kicking the plan into touch in which the 
initiative’s fate would be decided by a network of trade union representatives. A 
series of acerbic letters followed between the combine and the management. When 
Ernie Scarbrow, the combine’s secretary, requested material and manpower resources 
for further research, the response from the company was to employ the resources 
available from the trade unions.
62
 The continuation of referrals to the unions infuriated 
the combine, which cited how the lack of official recognition ‘represented a complete 
shift in the Company’s policy’ and ‘departed from industrial relations custom and 
practice over the last five years’.
63
 Still smarting from the official Lucas response to 
the workers’ plan, Scarbrow warned that to ‘have reached this decision without any 
negotiation represents for us a serious situation’.
64
  
 
The reaction from the Labour Party and the disarmament movement 
 
After from the rejection of the plan by the Lucas management, the combine appealed 
for assistance by Labour Government ministers at the Department of Industry. In a 
letter to the industry secretary Eric Varley on 14 October 1976, Ernie Scarbrow 
lamented how ‘the company have blankly refused to meet our combine committee, 
instead giving small, disconnected pieces of information to each site to prevent the 
trade unions as a whole having an overview of the company’s policies’.
65
 Varley did 
not personally respond, but the combine received a reply from the minister of state 
Gerald Kaufman, who was sceptical of the combine and of the concept of workers’ 
control of industry. Like the Lucas management, Kaufman believed that the best 
course of action to pursue the issue was ‘through the accepted trade union 
machinery’.
66
 This route would mean that that the Department of Industry would defer 
to the relevant trade unions who act as an intermediary between the combine and the 
Lucas management. This began a tense relationship between the combine and the 
Department of Industry over the next four years. In a response to Kaufman, Scarbrow 
reiterated that Lucas Aerospace was refusing to meet the combine both to discuss the 
plan and the Government’s tripartite strategy’.
67
 A letter from the other minister of 
state in the Department, Les Huckfield, continued on the same line, stating that it was 
a matter for the company and its employees to consider ‘a number of suggestions in 
the Plan’.
68
 The combine began to speculate as to what support the Labour ministers 
in the Department of Industry were showing.     
 However, the combine did receive a much favourable reaction from the 
Labour left who promoted the importance of the combine within the Government. 
Left-wing Labour MPs were by the mid-1970s engaged with their own alternative 
plan to reduce defence spending and convert military industry into socially useful 
production. In 1974 the Labour left set up a study group on the party’s National 
Executive Committee (NEC) to examine the potential for industrial conversion. The 
Lucas combine was the best example of how conversion could be achieved, and was 
lauded by the left on the study group. However, the study group attracted its own 
share of Labour MPs critical of drastic defence cuts, not least because of employment 
reasons. Among these were ministers of state at the various departments involved with 
military procurement, specifically the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and the 
Department of Industry. One of the most frequent attendees was Les Huckfield, the 
industry minister who, along with Kaufman, was chiefly involved in corresponding 
with the Lucas combine. Huckfield had exhibited more centre-left inclinations then 
Kaufman, and his correspondence displayed more empathy with the overall aims of 
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the combine to avert redundancies. Nonetheless, his dismissal of the combine’s plans 
was equally firm. In a revealing meeting with left-wing MPs on the defence study 
group, Huckfield outlined his opposition to the combine in detail.  
 Huckfield admitted that he regarded the Lucas combine as ‘a worthwhile 
initiative’, which had aimed to ‘utilize relevant skills in new ways’, and forming a 
‘constructive approach… where large scale restructuring was a possibility’.
69
  
However, this possibility was subject to conditions that the Labour minister sounded 
as a note of caution to his left-wing Party colleagues. Firstly, he thought that such 
diversification would take longer than what had been immediately envisioned by the 
combine, being of the belief that ‘a timescale of something like five years would be 
required to secure a large scale transition from military to civil production that makes 
proper use of the workforce’.
70
 This was explained by the demand of the market on 
which ‘job opportunities depended first of all’. It was clear that production would 
have to be directed towards an existing market, or else a new market would ‘have to 
be won… and not be taken for granted’, with Huckfield warning that it took ‘years of 
often heavy investment, to either break into new markets or significantly expand an 
existing one’. Rapidly enacted industrial conversion would be open to what Huckfield 
considered ‘high commercial risk for the companies concerned, and may involve calls 
for large scale government support’. There were concerns about the financial and 
employment implications. ‘New jobs’, the minister contended, ‘must not be at the 
expense of other workers’ jobs in industries already producing for markets into which 
defence industries might expand’. This was a clear reference to the lack of attention 
the combine gave to appealing to private industry. The focus of the combine was 
reliant on the state as the main customer, where public expenditure would be diverted 
into social utility rather than defence expenditure. This question of political economy, 
so central to the outcome of the combine, was effectively being shut down by the 
Labour ministers inside the Department of Industry on the grounds of the risk that 
could be posed to employment and manufacturing.     
 In the second half of his paper, Huckfield reiterated his earlier points on the 
risk to employment, but in more explicit terms, and with a focus on the virtues of 
military industry as major employer. While expressing ‘a great deal of sympathy’, for 
the combine, he was concerned at ‘the very severe depression in the civilian side of 
aircraft and shipbuilding’ which was ‘changing the emphasis of the markets for 
defence industries in the short term’.
71
 Huckfield made the link between the shrinking 
civilian market and the value of the defence sector, highlighting more clearly than 
ever before on its role as a major employer. ‘Defence industries’, particularly in a 
regional capacity ‘were an important part of industrial structure’, and were ‘of 
material value to associated civilian industry’. Pertaining to Lucas, the minister 
remarked how ‘in aerospace in particular, defence research and development has an 
important benefit for the viability of the civil industry’. Moreover, the export market, 
which was quoted by him as being worth some £850million per year could only be 
sustained ‘if the UK armed services continued to show confidence in it by buying it 
themselves’. This was a reference to the role of Lucas Aerospace in the Tornado 
military aircraft, with an optimistic forecast on its potential on the export market. 
Concluding the paper, Huckfield saw the solution as being in the hands of the trade 
unions: 
 
I believe we should take account of the trade unions which already 
organise in the defence industries and the views they frequently express to 
Government departments and ministers. They understand the difficulties 
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which are likely to be encountered in any transition from military to 
civilian work. What they tell us often is precisely the same point which I 
want to make in this submission - that any such transition will take a longer 
time than is frequently thought and must be carefully planned. 
 
While Labour ministers referred the combine to the trade unions, other Labour MPs 
were more supportive and provided much needed fortification for the combine. Two 
MPs, Audrey Wise and Jeff Rooker, identified with workers’ control and anti-
militarism. Consequently, the Lucas combine gained exposure in parliamentary 
debates. For example, when the annual government defence White Paper was debated 
in March 1977, Audrey Wise addressed the issue along economic lines, stating how 
the ‘greater our economic dependence on arms production, the more difficult we shall 
find it to respond to genuine initiatives on controlled disarmament’.
72
 Wise made 
reference to the combine’s alternative plan, and pleaded for the Labour Government 
ministers that ‘if we are ever to move towards controlled disarmament we shall have 
to look at alternative sources of employment for our people’.
73
   
 The combine was also a feature of constituency level politics as 
Labour MPs with a local interest in Lucas Aerospace appealed directly to the industry 
ministers. Doug Hoyle, the MP for the Lancashire seat of Nelson and Colne near the 
Lucas plant at Burnley, wrote to Kaufman expressing his belief that it ‘was monstrous 
that people [were] being thrown out of work when an alternative corporate plan that 
would prove beneficial to the nation is disregarded’.
74
 The plight of the Lucas 
combine was aired in the House of Commons during the final parliamentary debate on 
Roy Mason’s Defence Review on 1 April 1976. The Labour Left MP Tom Litterick, 
motivated by local concerns due to his constituency at Birmingham Selly Oak, 
commended the combine for having ‘worked out an armaments substitute production 
strategy in which workers use their sophisticated skills to produce useful articles 
which do not threaten anyone, thus maintaining work and sensible economic activity 
in place of a destructive, wasteful and wholly inflationary economic activity’.
75
 
Litterick went further to accuse the Labour Government of turning a blind eye to 
potentially ‘embarrassing policy statements such as those which have emerged from 
the workers of Lucas Aerospace, because the paranoia which underlies our arms 
strategy might be challenged by the voice of sanity, peace and hope for the rest of 
humanity’.
76
 The petitions made by backbench Labour MPs reached the very top of 
the political pyramid when the Prime Minister Jim Callaghan responded to a letter 
from Dan Jones, the Labour MP for Burnley, where Lucas Aerospace was a 
significant local employer. Callaghan began by ‘praising the efforts of the Lucas shop 
stewards… in a most welcome contribution to the national industrial relations 
scene.’
77
 The Prime Minister’s response sought to praise the Labour ministers who 
had been involved with the combine, citing that ‘as a result of the actions of Eric 
Varley, Tony Benn and Gerald Kaufman there are now central discussions taking 
place between the Lucas management’ and the relevant unions. Responding to Jones’ 
request for a tripartite meeting between the combine, the company management and 
the government, Callaghan felt that it could be organised ‘if it was felt that would 
help, before adding that ‘as I hope you will agree, after looking fairly at the 
Government’s record in this case, that the part taken by Ministers has been wholly 
constructive and that the best thing to do now is wait’.
78
 
 While experiencing frustration with the response from Labour 
ministers, the combine was met with enthusiasm from the wider disarmament 
movement. The workers’ phrase of ‘neither bombs nor dole, but conversion’ 
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resonated with the peace movement, not least because the combine had provided a 
practicable solution that had contrasted with the largely moralistic approach of nuclear 
unilateralists.
79
 In this sense, the combine compensated for the lack of technological 
expertise by those on the academic and political left. One shop steward remarked that 
‘the disarmament movement had failed to come up with an alternative, but once the 
workers had provided something detailed and credible the peace groups gave a lot of 
support’.
80
 CND was enthusiastic in its support for the combine, where delegates at its 
annual conference in 1978 acknowledged that ‘the situation had worsened’ insofar as 
‘the management had sought to offer redundancies in trying to undermine the Lucas 
Combine Committee’.81 CND thus resolved to place ‘greater emphasis on the 
promotion of alternatives to employment of people and resources in the arms 
industries and the armed forces’.82  CND’s general secretary Duncan Rees recalled 
that the combine had ‘broadened the debate to arms manufacture’ and so 
demonstrated that the ‘moral dimension of disarmament had a practical side, creating 
or saving jobs at the same time as reducing armaments’.83 The conference was 
addressed by Mike Cooley, a shop steward from the combine, who saw the CND as a 
potential vehicle for ‘ideas to be diffused as widely as possible to the rest of society’.84  
A resolution tendered by the specialist branch, Trade Union CND, who argued that ‘if 
the campaign for cuts in arms spending is to succeed in times of heavy 
unemployment, than the work of the Lucas stewards and others need to be matched by 
much stronger public demand’ for socially useful production.85  
 
The reaction from the trade unions 
 
The Labour Government had continually referred the combine to their relevant trade 
unions. The combine-union reaction would prove to be a mixed one, varying from 
union to union, and ultimately providing the main obstacle to any chance of 
implementing the combine’s plan for socially useful production. The combine initially 
enjoyed a favourable reaction from the most powerful union platform in Britain, the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC). Correspondence between the combine and the TUC 
began in a letter alerting it to Lucas Aerospace’s ‘plans for further redundancies at a 
number of sites’, and so representing a ‘multinational company intent on sacking 
highly skilled workers that you and this country so badly needs’.
86
 The secretary of 
the TUC’s economic department, David Lea, responded to the combine, ‘sharing their 
concerns about the company’s unwillingness to meet’, and explained how the case of 
the Lucas workers had been discussed at a recent meeting of the TUC’s Industrial 
Strategy Staff Group.
87
 Yet, the TUC was inclined to divert the combine in the 
direction of the company management, suggesting that the combine ‘again approach 
the company on this matter… pointing out that workers have an interest in and a 
responsibility for planning for a company’s future’.
88
 Writing to the Lucas’ director of 
personnel, the combine included a copy of the TUC letter, ‘acquainting the 
management with the TUC viewpoint’.
89
 The Lucas management issued a sharp 
response, stating that it would not recognise the combine as an official body, and that 
the company ‘would not make any arrangement that would prejudice the exiting 
procedural arrangements we have between both staff and the manual unions’.
90
 This 
response infuriated the combine, with the combine secretary Ernie Scarbrow stating 
that Lucas had performed a ‘complete shift in policy’ and that ‘not recognising the 
combine, represents for us a very serious situation’.
91
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          However, the display of support from the TUC, even if it was vague, was met 
with consternation from individual unions who had involvement with Lucas 
Aerospace. The combine committee was deemed by smaller unions as an ‘unofficial 
body’ and, the union resented the intervention of the TUC which he felt had ‘cut 
across the official trade union movement within Lucas’.
92
 The advice given by the 
TUC to the combine was thus ‘misleading’ in the encouragement it gave, and the 
union felt it was the responsibility of the TUC to correct it. This episode was 
indicative of the contemporary trade union environment, in which the TUC did not 
seek to over-ride individual unions on matters of industrial dispute at a local level. An 
apologetic David Lea responded directly, retracting his earlier encouragement to the 
combine, and stating ‘it was a matter of regret when existing procedures are 
accidentally cut across’.
93
 It was evident that this had been a chastening experience 
for representatives in the TUC. From this point onwards, as the archival holdings 
suggest, the TUC’s involvement was notable by its absence. 
 Instead, the key union for the prospects of the Lucas combine was the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (known as the CSEU, or 
Confederation for short) which acted as an umbrella organisation for a series of 
smaller technical unions in shipbuilding and aerospace. The Confederation would 
prove to be the ultimate obstacle to the combine, as the workers recalled that its 
‘insistence on controlling all contact between trade unionists in engineering and 
government ministers proved to be a major difficulty’.
94
 The Confederation ultimately 
adopted the role of dealing with the combine directly, filling a void that was 
purposefully left for them by the Labour ministers at the Department of Industry. This 
view was held by the combine itself, who viewed the Confederation and the Labour 
ministers as being of two sides of the same problem. Gerald Kaufman expressed the 
‘clear understanding from the Department that the Confederation would respond in a 
positive way to requests from the Combine Committee, provided of course [it] uses 
the established trade-union machinery’.
95
 This view was shared by Les Huckfield in 
his correspondence with Labour’s National Executive Committee that same month, 
stressing that ‘plans should initially be discussed by with the Lucas management 
through recognised trade union channels’.
96
 This was evidently the preferred option of 
the Labour ministers, rather than direct intervention.   
 The terminology of ‘recognised trade union channels’ was interpreted as a 
‘creeping innuendo’ by the Lucas combine.
97
 It was significant in two ways, both of 
which would impede the alternative plan. Firstly, the Labour ministers abdicated the 
possibility of direct intervention, electing instead to defer to union policy to steer the 
course between the combine and the Lucas management. Secondly, there was the 
issue of official recognition of the combine by Confederation. The Lucas combine 
was not an official union body, and was instead regarded as having represented 
employees from a variety of different Lucas facilities nationwide. This diminished the 
standing of the combine in the view of both the ministers and the unions. What made 
the situation more difficult for the combine was that their fate now rested on union 
intervention, given that a Department of Industry had gradually withdrawn from 
making direct approaches to the Lucas management.   
 Relations between the combine and the Confederation were fraught from the 
offset. Feeling ‘surprise and disappointment that there was no response’ to an earlier 
letter, Scarbrow lamented how ‘it might be just a matter of routine for you, but for us 
it is a matter of whether we will lose our jobs or not’, and that there was ‘no option 
but to inform the ministers that there was no response from the trade union.
98
 This 
began a process in which the combine sought a ‘tripartite meeting’ between 
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themselves, the Lucas management and the Department of Industry, and so would 
bypass the Confederation altogether. The combine wrote to the industry secretary Eric 
Varley in order to ‘establish precisely why the Company is unwilling to discuss [the] 
plans’, and citing how ‘a more direct action is required by the government’ to ‘break 
out of this impasse that the Company’s intransigence is placing on us’.
99
 Varley did 
not respond, in keeping with his general lack of correspondence with the combine 
after 1976. Instead Huckfield again replied to the combine, stating that both he and 
Kaufman approached the Confederation, and had felt that this was the best channel for 
advancing the initiative.
100
 At this point the exasperation felt by the combine had 
manifested in its correspondence. In another letter, again directed to Varley, the 
combine articulated how it was ‘continually given the impression by the Company 
that the Department supports them against us’, and saw ‘no good reason why the 
Department would not accede to the request’ for a tripartite meeting.
101
 Huckfield 
tried to allay the grievances felt by the combine in remarking how he was ‘sorry that 
you got the impression that the government was supporting the management against 
the workforce’, reinforcing that both he and Kaufman had ‘told the management that 
we would be most concerned at redundancies’.
102
  
 Nonetheless, by deferring to the trade unions, the Labour ministers had 
empowered the Confederation to deal with the combine. Over the course of 1978, the 
Confederation met the Lucas management with increased frequency. The first such 
meeting occurred in March 1978, and later in July. Huckfield was pleased to note that 
a ‘working group’ had been established, including ‘some members of the Combine 
Shop Stewards Committee’, with the aim of ‘visiting sites threatened with closure’. 
He was hopeful that the work of the combine could be utilised, believing that ‘the 
intention is to report on the prospects for alternative work at these sites, and no doubt 
the working party will take into account the suggestions for alternative products in the 
Plan’.
103
 However, it was evident from the outset that the Confederation was 
unwilling to recognise the combine as an official trade union group. The minutes of 
the Confederation’s Executive Committee record how an application from the 
combine ‘for official recognition’ was received in Aril 1978. Nonetheless, the 
Confederation leadership stated that there ‘was no provision in the constitution for the 
recognition of combine committees’.
104
 This major trade union, which represented 
workers across a broad spectrum of mechanical engineering across Britain, did not 
want a smaller, unofficial combine of potentially militant left-wing shop-stewards 
meddling in its relations with business. The Confederation, in its capacity as the 
largest representative of skilled labour in Lucas Aerospace, used its influence to 
discuss with the company management directly, over the heads of the workers. This 
was clear in a series of meetings in 1978, just as the combine was beginning to lose its 
momentum.   
 When the Confederation did engage with the Lucas management, it was not on 
the issues of either the combine or alternative production. Instead, the Confederation 
took its own interest of ‘requesting a meeting of the management on employment 
prospects’ of the company.
105
 In reply, the Lucas management stated that ‘it was 
making a detailed assessment of the business… but it was certainly the intention to 
meet’.
106
 The Confederation liaised with the Lucas management on its restructuring of 
the aerospace sector, and ‘would endorse the decision to campaign for the buying of 
20 British 111-600 series’, a commercial jet aimed for Boeing in the American market 
‘and that the Executive Committee would be kept fully informed regarding further 
arrangements’.
107
 The issue was of contemporary significance, as the specific aircraft 
was debated in the House of Lords the following month.
108
 The Confederation was 
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evidently more concerned with sustaining employment, making formal 
representations to the Lucas management. A belief existed within the union that it 
held significant sway, recording that after having discussions within the management 
about the restructuring of the company. The announcement in May 1978 of a new 
Lucas Aerospace plant in Huyton, Liverpool, with the employment of some 500 
skilled workers, was ‘met with satisfaction’ from the Confederation, which 
confidently asserted that ‘there was no doubt that our representations had an influence 
on this matter’.
109
   
 The revelation of the new plant in Huyton aroused suspicion and 
disappointment from the combine. The constituency’s sitting MP was none other that 
the former Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and the combine did not hesitate to 
accuse the Labour Government, Department of Industry and the Confederation of 
having a close relationship with Lucas Aerospace. Ernie Scarbrow’s letter to Jeff 
Rooker, a Liverpool MP who supported the combine, showed what he felt was the 
reasoning behind the Government’s announcement:  
 
We now think that the inactivity of the Department of Industry may be 
more sinister than just bureaucratic obstruction… Lucas is heavily 
dependent on government purchasing power, not only in the aircraft 
industry but also in the automotive field… we think they would not have 
dared to announce a factory closure in somewhere as sensitive as Liverpool 
without a nod from somewhere in government. The Lucas Aerospace 
Combine was seeking a parliamentary enquiry into the role of the 
Department of Industry in all of this.
110
 
 
Although the Confederation had a clear ownership of the combine issue, there was 
evidence of dissent from some smaller unions, who called into question the role 
played by both the major unions and the Labour Government in the apparent impasse. 
In July 1978, a resolution was passed by the Coventry branch of the Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers, an area close to both Lucas Aerospace and Rolls 
Royce facilities. The resolution called ‘upon the Government to investigate the 
obstruction by ministers and their colleagues’ into the situation, and sought ‘an open 
and public debate on the role that ministers played in the matter’.
111
 Huckfield 
responded directly by reiterating how the Department of Industry had ‘consistently 
welcomed the efforts’ of the combine, ‘but felt that detailed discussion’ about the 
workers’ plan ‘should take place between representatives of the workforce and 
company management’.
112
 That same month, the Labour MP Jeff Rooker referred to 
the resolution in the Commons, calling on Kaufman at ministers’ questions to respond 
to the ‘inquiry into the role of the Department of Industry in the last two years, when 
it has done nothing to help these workers’.
113
 Kaufman responded to Rooker by 
emphasising that if the ‘Confederation comes forward with plans or asks for a 
tripartite meeting, the Government will convene it’.     
 In 1978, a half-hour documentary was commissioned by the Open University 
in conjunction with the Centre for Alternative, Industrial and Technological Systems 
(CAITS) to detail the combine’s experience. Entitled, ‘Doesn’t Anybody Want to 
Know?’, the documentary featured interviews with combine members across the 
country, including workers on the shop floor and shop stewards such as Mike Cooley 
and Ernie Scarbrow. The documentary vividly captured the frustration felt by the 
combine towards the Labour Government, Lucas management and trade unions. Mike 
Cooley argued that the main obstacle was the ‘concern felt by the company at the shift 
in power to the workers’, while the trade unions refused to recognise the workers’ 
Page 14 of 21
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fcbh
Contemporary British History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
plan as it ‘operated outside of union traditions’.
114
 The documentary also featured 
interviews with Labour MPs Jeff Rooker and Audrey Wise who lamented ‘the great 
myth as far as the Lucas Aerospace shop stewards are concerned that parliament runs 
the country’ when it was the ‘executive branch of government in Whitehall’ made the 
major decisions. With the bleak forecast of further job losses across Lucas Aerospace, 
the tone of the documentary was rueful of the lost opportunities of the 1970s. The 
Labour Government was criticised for its inaction, despite Tony Benn, at that point 
the energy minister, giving his own analysis of the combine. Benn was evidently in 
favour of the combine’s alternative plans, as he had been when he first met the 
workers in 1974. However, his advice to the workers’ when interviewed in the 
documentary was to take the ‘long term perspective’. His comparison of the combine 
to the radical movements of the Levellers and the Chartists was met by derision from 
the makers of the documentary who scorned how: 
 
‘The long-term perspective may be fine for a politician like Tony Benn, but it doesn’t 
deal with the immediate prospect of plan closures ad loss of jobs that the alternative 
corporate plan was designed to avoid’.
115
 
 
The fortunes of the combine were not to improve after these series of challenges from 
the Labour Government and the trade unions. Labour’s defeat at the 1979 General 
Election, while not ending the activity of the combine outright, did herald a new set of 
challenges. The Conservatives were against the idea of workers’ cooperatives, and did 
not give much consideration to industrial conversion. The workers recalled that this in 
effect let the Lucas management off the hook, as the ‘company avoided the 
embarrassment of any political limelight that the discussions on alternative products 
might have attracted under a Labour Government’.
116
 No such interest was expressed 
from the Labour ministers, let alone on the Conservative side. Instead as the early 
1980s unfolded, what the combine considered as ‘the abrasively anti-union 
atmosphere of the Thatcher government’ fostered an environment in which Lucas 
Aerospace ‘could move more directly to undermine trade-union strength’.
 117
 There 
was admissions of exhaustion and exasperation from the combine itself, having been 
‘entangled for three years in the ropes of Confederation procedures and the red tape of 
the Department of Industry, was [no longer] in a position to stand up to the new 
offensive’.
118
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Lucas combine was venerated by the left who continued their attack on British 
defence expenditure into the 1980s. In two of the most famous left-wing accounts of 
Cold War militarism, Mary Kaldor referenced the case of the Lucas combine, both in 
the 1980 Protest and Survive and in her own Baroque Arsenal in 1982, which argued 
of a military-industrial-complex within the western powers.
119
 The example of Lucas 
was clearly seen in another combine in a major British defence manufacturer, Vickers, 
who produced military aircraft and shipping, including the new sea-based nuclear 
deterrent, Trident. The case of the workers at Vickers met with similar resistance from 
company management, and was accounted for in significant detail, again by Hilary 
Wainwright.
120
 Despite the decline of the Lucas combine by the late 1970s, its 
example was adopted by leftist academics who in 1978 established the Centre for 
Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems (CAITS) and the North London 
Polytechnic. The combine became a beacon for the 1980s campaign for alternative 
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production in the technology industry, as evidenced by Mike Cooley’s influential 
scientific account Architect or Bee? that included a retrospective account, ‘The Lucas 
Combine Ten Years On’.
121
 Although the combine failed to achieve its objectives in 
the 1970s, its legacy continued to be significant among left-wing academics and 
workers.          
 The Lucas combine succeeded at the very least in exemplifying how industrial 
conversion could achieved. That the combine co-existed independently from the 
influence of the left-wing on the Labour Party is an important consideration. ‘Socially 
useful production’ was not the preserve of the academic and political spheres; instead 
it was more evident and at an earlier stage in the defence industry. There was a 
growing belief that workers could provide the alternative. This was, as Richard 
Hyman argued in 1975, a response to the industrial crises of the early 1970s, where 
workers adopted what he regarded as a ‘positive challenge to the employer, involving 
a different relationship of control’.
122
 Michael Gold elaborated on this change of 
relationship at more length in 2004 when reviewing industrial relations in the 1970s, 
including the Lucas combine:  
 
These positive challenges to the employer reveal attempts to harness 
creatively the motivation and commitment to defend their jobs in times of 
threat. They all took into account the specific circumstances of the workers 
involved, such as their labour-market conditions, the size and structure of 
the industry concerned, the nature of the product markets, skill profile and 
links to the wider community.
123
 
The Lucas combine is regarded more r cently by the left as a triumph of worker’s 
ambition for alternative production. A Guardian article in 2014 recalled how ‘half of 
Lucas’ output supplied military contracts [which] depended upon public funds’, and 
so ‘workers argued state support be better put to developing more socially useful 
products’.
124
 Another Guardian article argued that the Lucas combine ‘challenged 
some of the presumed technophobia of the left’, that was felt that leftist thinkers were 
limited only to theoretical frameworks, and not actual prototypes.
125
 The socialist 
magazine, Red Pepper, remarked that the ‘alternative plan and the combine committee 
were a classic product of the co-operative, egalitarian creativity of the late 1960s and 
1970s’ which challenged ‘authority and sought individual realisation’.
126
 But the 
combine instead ‘came up against trade union, government and management 
institutions stuck in the command and control mentalities, and the power of the 
movement was destroyed by Thatcher's onslaught against the unions and radical local 
government in the 1980s’.
127
 However, it was not simply the arrival of a Conservative 
Government in 1979 that defeated the Lucas combine. It was also argued to have been 
undone by ‘a retreat from radicalism of the Labour Government’ after coming to 
office in 1974, and by the ‘suspicion and intransigence of some sections of the 
national leadership of the trade unions’.
128
             
 The legacy of the Lucas combine can be seen in more recent critiques of 
British defence-industrial policy. Economic circumstances have prompted a greater 
scrutiny on public expenditure, with defence being the main target for left-wing 
opposition, just as it had been in the 1970s. The left-wing of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party is not as sizeable as it was in the 1970s, and external peace-movements have 
provided the most significant enquiry into the political economy of defence spending. 
For instance, workers at the Unite union in 2016 issued a pamphlet, Unite against 
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Trident, which detailed ‘an alternative vision of expanding employment away from 
arms production and into renewable energy and environmental technologies’.
129
 More 
publicly, CND has framed its opposition to the Trident replacement system by arguing 
that public expenditure would be better spent on the socially useful production, 
especially in healthcare. Moreover, CND have rejected the case that cancellation of 
Trident would cost jobs by arguing that this technological expertise could be 
employed in civilian industries.
130
 The Lucas combine continues to provide an 
example of how industrial conversion could be achieved, with a clear similarity to the 
economic conditions in the 1970s that intensifies left-wing ambitions for change. 
Nonetheless, there still exists a reliance on the government to enact radical changes in 
policy. With a broad consensus on the nuclear question, as was the case during the 
Cold War, left-wing activists continue to campaign against the long established 
patterns of defence-industrial policies.     
 Arguably the most considered critique of the Lucas combine was a review of 
The Lucas Plan: A New Trade Unionism in the Making? by Marxism Today in 1982. 
The reviewer, Grahame Thompson, praised the ‘fascinating and enterprising attempt 
to preserve jobs’ from the combine, but added two important critical observations. 
Firstly, the combine was by its nature fragmented over a combination of regional 
facilities, and a lack of a ‘nationally agreed strategy’ meant that it was ‘unlikely that 
the range of products could be successfully produced or marketed’. To this end, 
Thompson thought the combine was being ‘too ambitious rather than not being 
ambitious enough’, and should have curtailed its energy into a restricted number of 
marketable products.
131
 The second critique cut to the core of the ‘socially-useful’ 
ideal, noting that concept of ‘socially useful production’ remained ‘relatively 
unexplored’ in the workers’ plan. Thompson argued that although the combine’s 
prototypes were technically feasible and of apparent social utility, this was ‘no 
argument that they would provide a financially and economically viable set of 
products’. Thompson challenged the conceptual underpinning that motivated the 
combine, as well as the intellectual left had that encouraged it: 
 
 We need to question whether armaments production is not as socially 
useful as is made out. Clearly this one of the UK’s most successful 
industries, and measured in terms of international competitiveness and the 
absence of a benign international situation, quite a socially useful one, it 
could be argued. What is not socially useful about wanting to defend one’s 
national integrity as best one can? As it stands, the authors of the Lucas 
Plan adopt a somewhat moralistic attitude towards what is socially useful 
or not, mirroring the more general Left hostility towards arms production.  
 
That the defence industry was one of Britain’s more successful industries, as 
Thompson observed, is a crucial point in the failure of the combine. While the 
workers focused on the social utility of the alternatives to defence production, they 
failed to both take account of the success of Lucas Aerospace as a military contractor 
and as to where a new market for socially useful products could be cultivated. The 
combine needs to be seen within the context of British weapon procurement policy in 
the Cold War. The policy of successive governments to ‘buy British’ enabled firms 
such as Lucas to become more reliant on lucrative defence contracts and developed a 
close working relationship between the company and government departments such as 
the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Industry.
132
 The motivation of the 
combine was twofold - to move away from defence production, and to redirect control 
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of production away from the company-state-union axis towards the workers. But 
ultimately, on both defence and industrial reform, the Lucas combine was unassisted 
by a Labour Government unwilling to impede on military production and the trade 
union status quo. In so doing, Labour’s defence and industrial policy continued to be 
resistant to change. The Lucas Aerospace combine was seen, as early as the 1980s, as 
being of its time. The combine was deemed as being ‘correctly hesitant about the 
adequacy of nationalisation as a socialist objective’, but had still not plotted a 
definitive way forward for those on the left. ‘Fresh approaches’, Grahame Thompson 
remarked in 1983, would ‘also need to be developed that do not uncritically endorse 
or fetishise “workers initiatives” either’.
133
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